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In the 1970s, Congress reacted to the financial wrongdoing
of Lockheed Corp. and others by enacting § 102 of the Foreign
Corrupt PracticesAct (FCPA), which (1) requires corporationsto
keep records that accurately reflect financial transactions and
(2) mandates a system of internal accounting controls. Going a
step further in 2002, Congress responded to the Enron scandal
by imposing personal accountability on chief executive officers
in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOA). After recounting responses
prior to the existence of the Securities and Exchange
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effect of the SOA's correspondingprovisions againstfraudulent
and unethical behavior.
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I. INTRODUCTION

On July 30, 2002, President Bush signed into law the SarbanesOxley Act (hereinafter, SOA or Sarbanes-Oxley).I A number of its
provisions impose formal financial reporting responsibilities on
corporate-governance
gatekeepers-namely,
officers,
directors,
auditors, attorneys, and securities analysts. 2 Congress intended these
financial disclosure requirements to establish a healthy capital
market.
The Authors will address the likely success of the SOA provision
that requires chief executive officers (CEOs) and chief financial
officers (CFOs) to be personally accountable with regard to their
reporting and disclosure responsibilities, 3 in effect subjecting them to
potential criminal penalties for knowing or willful violations. 4 The
SOA's accounting requirement-that CEOs and CFOs certify the
financial statements as being fair and complete-along with its
requirement for the disclosure of deficiencies in internal controls 5 are
reminiscent of the accounting requirements for fair and accurate
recordkeeping and implementation of internal controls imposed upon
issuers (i.e., corporations) under the 1977 Foreign Corrupt Practices
6
Act (FCPA).
A pending critical issue is whether Sarbanes-Oxley will
accomplish its goal of halting or substantially deterring corrupt and
unethical corporate conduct. In each decade of recent history, major
business scandals have occurred-along with accompanying

1.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 7201 (2005)).
2.
See John C. Coffee Jr., UnderstandingEnron: 'It's About the Gatekeepers,
Stupid', 57 Bus. LAW. 1403, 1405 (2002); Robert Prentice, Enron: A Brief Behavioral
Autopsy, 40 AM. Bus. L.J. 417, 443, 440 (2003).
3.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act §§ 302(a), 906(a).
4.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 906.
5.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act §§ 302(a), 906(a).
6.
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78(a), (in), (dd)(1), (dd)(2), (ff)) (amending scattered
sections of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C §§ 77(a)-78(kk) (1976));
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 100-418, §§ 5001-5003, 102 Stat. 1415
(1988) (enacted as part of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L.
No. 100-418, §§ 1001-1003, 102 Stat. 1107); International Anti-Bribery and Fair
Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-366, §§ 001-0006, 112 Stat. 3302.
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legislative, regulatory, and judicial reactions. During the late 1980s
and early 1990s, the savings and loan crisis severely jolted the U.S.
public. The industry was crumbling because, for example, Charles
Keating, CEO of Lincoln Savings and Loan, had been using federally
insured deposits to fund risky personal investments in real estate and
junk bonds.7 Symbols of the business excesses of the 1980s include
flagrant insider trading by Ivan Boesky, Michael Milken, Dennis
Levine, and R. Foster Winans.8 Analogously, looking back to the
1970s, one finds similar accounting manipulations and off-the-books
transactions in addition to slush funds and misleading accounting
entries intended by Lockheed and other major corporations to hide
their bribery of foreign officials to obtain contracts that were
discovered during the Watergate investigations.9 The first decade of
the twenty-first century has seen a global shockwave with the
10
implosion of many major U.S. corporations, including Enron,

7.

STEPHEN PIZZO ET AL., INSIDE JOB: THE LOOTING OF AMERICA'S SAVINGS

AND LOANS (1989). Kitty Calavita & Henry Pontell, Heads I Win Tails You Lose:
Deregulation, Crime and Crisis in the Savings and Loan Industry, 36 CRIME & DELINQ.
322 (1990).
8.
See generally DOUGLAS FRANTZ, LEVINE & CO.: WALL STREET'S INSIDER
TRADING SCANDAL (1987); R. FOSTER WINANS, TRADING SECRETS, SEDUCTION AND
SCANDAL AT THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (1986); Michael A. Hiltzik, Accounting in

Levine Case: Court Filings Shed Light on An Insider Trader's Finances, WALL ST. J.,
July 15, 1987, at 4(1).

9.
Despite the similarities, certainly many differences exist between the
Enron and Lockheed situations. The first difference is in the parties injured by the
fraud. The bribery of foreign officials by U.S. corporations helped those companies to
obtain additional lucrative contracts, so stockholders and employees were not
negatively affected. On the other hand, the accounting fraud of the Enron-era allowed
vast fiscal losses to amass to the extreme detriment of stockholders and employees.
10.
The Houston, Texas-based company, formed in 1985, grew into the nation's
seventh-biggest company in revenue by buying electricity from generators and selling it
to consumers. Although admired as an innovator, it used complex partnerships to keep
more than $500 million in debt off its books and mask its financial problems so it could
continue to get cash and credit to run its trading business. Enron filed for protection
from creditors on December 2, 2002, in the biggest corporate bankruptcy in U.S.
history. Its stock, worth more than $80 a share a year before, tumbled to pennies a
share. See Explaining the Enron Bankruptcy (Jan. 13, 2002), available at
http://www.cnn.com/2002/US/O1/12/enron.qanda.focus/index.html (last visited Feb. 1,
2004).
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WorldCom, 11 Tyco, 12 and HealthSouth.1 3 And the huge European
Parmalat scandal occurred in December 2003.14
Many analogies can be made between the reaction of legislators

11.
WorldCom, based in Clinton, Mississippi, operated
a massive
telecommunications business. It owned MCI, the second largest U.S. long distance
carrier. Arthur Andersen, of Enron fame, handled its audits. During 2001 and the first
quarter of 2002, at least $3.8 billion in operating expenses were improperly booked as
capital expenses, falsely inflating profit margins, thus enabling the company to report
a $1.5 billion net profit for 2001. Peter J. Howe, WorldCom on the Brink, BOSTON
GLOBE, June 27, 2002, at Al; Joe Lauria, U. S. Investigators Are To Expand Their
Inquiry into The WorldCom Fraud By Seeking Evidence That Deception Went Beyond
the $3.8BN in Inflated Profits the Company has Already Admitted, BUSINESS, June 30,
2002, at 1, available at Lexis Nexis Academic Universe, Sunday Business Group;
Jonathan Moules & Peter Thal Larsen, Reports Condemn Culture of Fraud at
WorldCom, FIN. TIMES, June 10, 2003, at 1.
12.
The former chairman and chief executive and the former chief financial
officer are accused of stealing $170 million from the company and reaping $430 million
more by selling Tyco stock after artificially inflating its value. See Stephen Pounds &
Jeff Ostrowski, Board Oblivious to Tyco Looting Directors Slow to Challenge CEO,
PALM BEACH NEWSPAPERS, INC., Nov. 17, 2002, at IF, available at Lexis Nexis
Academic Universe, News Library, Palm Beach Post File; Andrew Ross Sorkin, A
Tangled Tyco Case will Hardly be a Snap, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Jan. 12, 2004, at 10;
Andrew Ross Sorkin, Tyco Details Lavish Lives of Executives, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18,
2002, at 1; Andrew Ross Sorkin, Tyco Figure Pays $22.5 Million in Guilt Plea, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 18, 2002, at 1.
13.
HealthSouth, founded by Richard Scrushy, operates the nation's largest
chain of rehabilitation hospitals. Its corporate offices are in Birmingham, Alabama.
The company is accused of engaging in accounting fraud by adding at least $1.4 billion
in nonexistent earnings to its profits since 1999 and inflating company assets by $800
million. It is claimed that HealthSouth's auditor, Ernst & Young, did not detect the
fraud because company executives created false ledgers. See Kathleen Day, SEC Sues
HealthSouth, CEO Over Earnings;Former CFO Pleads Guilty to Fraud, WASH. POST,
Mar. 20, 2003, at E01; Milt Freudenheim, Hospital Chain is Accused of Accounting
Fraud,N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2003, at 1.
14.
It was discovered in January 2004 that Parmalat, an Italian dairy and food
company, was engaged in a multi-billion euro fraud. Europeans had expressed
astonishment at the massive accounting fraud at Enron in 2002, and some had
declared "This [Enron] could never happen here." See Mark Landler, Europeans
Struggle with Home-Grown FinancialScandal, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Dec. 26, 2003, at 9.
Europeans appeared to be under the impression that Enron was an example of how
self-destructive the U.S.'s relentless hyper-capitalism can get and that corporate
ethical standards and the prevailing accounting system would have prevented such
fraud from occurring in Europe. See The Lessons of Parmalat,INT'L HERALD TRIB., Jan.
10, 2004, at 6. But the accounting fraud that has emerged at Parmalat is similar to
many of the recent discoveries of fraud in the U.S. and is being referred to as the
"European Enron." Parmalat understated debt by $15.6 billion, overstated earnings by
five times, and overreported sales by thirty-five times on the company's financial
statements. The company was dominated by its founding Tanzi family and had many
layers of obfuscating holding companies and subsidiaries. See Roger Adams, Now
Europe Needs to Declare War on Fraud, INTL HERALD TRIB., Jan. 14, 2004, at 7; Eric
Sylvers, Parmalat Audit Finds a Debt of 14.3 Billion, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Jan. 27,
2004, at 11. A bank account that supposedly had $4.9 billion did not exist at all. The
fraud was exposed when, in response to the Italian Nine-Year Change of Auditors Rule,
Deloitte & Touche replaced Grant Thornton as Parmalat's auditor. See Floyd Norris,
New Puzzles in Parmalat'sAccounts, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Dec. 24-25, 2003, at 1.
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and regulators to accounting misconduct of the Lockheed-era of the
1970s, on the one hand, and the Enron-era of 2002 on the other.
These analogies provide a basis for assessing the possibility that SOA
will deter accounting fraud in the future. Both the Lockheed and
Enron scandals involved misleading and deceptive accounting
practices. Congress reacted to the financial manipulations of
Lockheed and other corporate bribers by enacting §102 of the FCPA,
which required issuers to make and keep books, records, and accounts
that, with reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect transactions
and dispositions of assets; it also required issuers to devise and
maintain a system of internal accounting controls. 15 Congress
responded similarly to the Enron scandal, except that the onus to
report accurately fell not on the corporations (i.e., the "issuers"), but
instead on CEOs personally. SOA § 906(a) requires CEOs and CFOs
to certify that financial statements filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) are true and correct. 16 Section 302 of
the SOA, which also contains a certification requirement, additionally
mandates that CEOs implement effective internal controls to ensure
that financial statements are true and correct and disclose any
deficiencies or fraud by anyone who has significant control over the
17
production of financial statements.
After recognizing the similarities between the Enron and
Lockheed situations, it is useful to determine how successful the
legislation was-after more than two decades of the FCPA's increased
the
accounting
halting
reporting
requirements-in
misrepresentations that hid acts of corporate bribery. This
information may provide a way to forecast the success of introducing
into
corporate reporting
accountability
increased personal
requirements as a mechanism to deter Enron-like conduct in which
top corporate officers willingly engage or turn a "blind eye" to
accounting schemes that falsely inflate profits. It may also provide
further insight into the progressive development of SEC corporate
reporting requirements, which were initially created at the federal
level in the 1934 Securities and Exchange Act.' 8
In this Article, after recounting pre-SEC historical responses to
business and corporate abuses, the Authors trace the historical

15.

15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2).

16.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 906(a), 116 Stat. 745
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 7201 (2005)).
17.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act §302(a).
H.R. REP. No. 73-1383, at 11 (1934), reprinted in 5 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
18.
THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, at 2 (J.S.

Ellenberger et a]. eds., 1973). Congress first recognized the importance of formal
disclosure and reporting requirements as a partial solution to the stock market crash of
the Great Depression through passage of Section 13 of the 1934 Act requiring an
annual report on Form 10K, a quarterly report on Form 10-Q, and a report on Form 8K for any month in which certain listed events occur.
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background of the SEC's corporate financial reporting and disclosure
requirements, discuss the progression to personal accountability of
corporate officers from Rule 10b-5 to the present, and outline the
evolution of corporate abuses from the 1977 FCPA to the 2002 SOA.
The Authors then examine the similarities of reporting issues arising
from the passage of the FCPA and the SOA. They also compare
currently pending SOA reporting issues in the case of HealthSouth
Corp. (hereinafter, HRC or HealthSouth) to FCPA reporting issues
arising repeatedly in a number of Lockheed cases. Finally, the
Authors evaluate additional factors that can be used to assess the
possibility of the success of the SOA's certification requirements in
deterring corrupt and unethical behavior.

II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Corporate abuse and misconduct have been plaguing the
investing public since the seventeenth century. It is important to
review the types of fraudulent activities that through the centuries
have driven governments and regulators to protect prospective
victims. Finally, since the CEO personal certification requirements
represent the furthest inroads made toward personal accountability,
a brief examination of Rule 10b-5's liability implications is given to
provide some insight into how the SEC began imposing personal
responsibility on corporate officers.
A. HistoricalContext of CorporateAbuses Leading to State Action on
Disclosure:1694-1852
The Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 are customarily regarded as the starting points for protecting
investors. Both require the disclosure of information thought to be
necessary for the public to make prudent investment decisions. 19 But
to appreciate the historical context of these statutes, it is best to

19.
In their introduction to a volume containing the Proceedings of a 1971
symposium on ethical and other problems of corporate financial reporting, the
organizers articulated as well as anyone has the rationale for the focus of our securities
laws on accurate disclosure:
Accurate and reliable information is the cornerstone upon which an
economically effective capital market is built. If such a market is to allocate
capital resources among competing claimants, there must be adequate data to
appraise the utility of capital in various enterprises, and there must be
confidence on the part of investors and lenders that the data is accurately
prepared and presented in good faith by the seekers of capital.
CORPORATE FINANCIAL REPORTING: ETHICAL AND OTHER PROBLEMS 1 (John C. Burton
ed., 1972).
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begin further back in time. The October 1929 crash, although
traumatic to those affected by it, was hardly the first time in history
that losses were incurred as the result of market abuses. As Ralph de
Bedts points out in his history of the formative years of the SEC:
In the history of man's attempts to preserve integrity in the realm of
financial transactions, some continuity in the insurance of such honesty
can be seen from century to century. The passage of laws and the
accretion of custom have aided; occasionally government itself operated
a medieval bank of exchange. However, in that area of financial
honesty concerned with protecting the unwary investor from the
fraudulent activities of the dishonest stockbroker or issuer of securities,
no faintest semblance of orderly progression can be found. The actions
and experience of one century seemingly have no connection with the
legislative flurries in a subsequent period, and the observer is acutely
aware of an utter lack of continuity. Only one thing remains in common
in several centuries of legislative efforts to regulate the exploiter of the
investor. Inevitably such attempts come about only when the disastrous
results are seen in retrospect. Calamity must befall those who have
20
ventured their funds before protective measures may be launched.

While it must be painful for a historian to demonstrate how little
has been learned from history, de Bedts dutifully tracks thirteenth
century English guild regulation, which required licensing of
brokers, 21 to Parliament's adoption in 1697 of '[a]n act to restrain the
number and ill practice of brokers and stock jobbers.' ' 22 These early
enactments focused on broker abuse. De Bedts points out that
"[flraudulent practice originating in the abuse of corporate privileges,
rather than through the activities of brokers, required no such
23
restrictive legislation prior to the seventeenth century in England.
The reason was that "[b]efore the issuance of shares was common,
large commercial undertakings were generally carried out by guilds,
' 24
rich merchants, or through partnerships."
It was not until joint-stock companies were developed to finance
expanding privateering and colonizing activities that ownership was
dispersed into numerous hands. 25 At that point, "the joint-stock
company revealed itself as not only a valuable instrument for
financing new industries and colonization but as an ingeniously

20.
RALPH F. DE BEDTS, THE NEW DEAL'S SEC: THE FORMATIVE YEARS 1 (1964).
21.
"[E]vidence exists that during the century there were numerous
prosecutions of brokers engaging in unlicensed activity." Id.
22.
Id. at 2. De Bedts observed:
Under the terms of this legislation brokers were required to take a fiduciary
oath. Their number was not to exceed one hundred in England, their fee was
limited to a modest 10 percent, and each was required to keep on his person a
metal token properly stamped to establish his identity.

Id.
23.
24.
25.

Id.
Id.
Id.
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irresponsible device for defrauding that portion of the public eager to
invest its surplus wealth."2 6 The creation of such facilitating
institutions as the Bank of England in 1694 and the London Stock
Exchange in 1696 "inaugurated a period of financial experimentation
and credit expansion," and "[tlhe wars of the Spanish Succession
aided in a general development of trade and industry, marked by a
number of increasingly hazardous trading ventures in the opening
decades of the eighteenth century." 27 Successive waves of speculative
"bubbles" and their subsequent collapse gave rise to the "Bubble Act"
of 1720, "passed by a Parliament exceedingly aware of the
contemporary wave of suicides, ruination, and imprisonment of high
28
officials."
The setback in corporate development resulting from the Bubble
Act was eventually overcome by the industrial growth of the following
century. In response to newly emerging abuses, the Companies Act of
1844 introduced "the principle of disclosure and the imposition of
penalties against violators." 29 Subsequent amendments "continually
expanded the prospectus requirements and liability provisions into
'30
the twentieth-century version of the act.
B. State Action and FederalActivities in the SecuritiesArea Before the
1933 Act: 1852-1933
Against this background, the regulation of the issuance of
securities in the United States can be traced to common carriers in
Massachusetts as far back as 1852. A prohibitory clause in
California's 1879 constitution recognized the perils of buying stock on
margin, and the first federal regulation came with the Interstate
Commerce Commission's regulation of the issuing of securities by the
common carriers under its jurisdiction. 31 Most regulation was done at
the state level, following Kansas' enactment in 1911 of the first "blue
sky" law. 32 While lower federal courts initially struck down these

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 3.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 3-4.
Id. at 4. At the turn of the century:

Swarms of stock sharpsters had descended on Kansas as one of the most
prosperous areas, and were greedily foraging their way through the
accumulative greenbacks of the Kansas farm population. A legislator at the
state capitol in 1911 informed his fellows with angry, fist-shaking incredulity
that stock swindlers would sell shares in the blue sky above if action was not
immediately forthcoming.
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state laws as unconstitutional, the U.S. Supreme Court in 1917
"reversed the lower courts and upheld the constitutional right of the
33
state to regulate sales of securities."
During the early twentieth century, attention at the federal level
"centered more on national banking activities and the dangers of
concentrated financial control. '34 Although bills were introduced in
Congress to provide protection to investors, 35 no legislation was
enacted during the 1920s, in spite of the fact that these years
"marked the era of the widest participation, up to that time, of the
36
small purchaser in the American securities market.
Able to finance stock buying as never before, the small purchaser had
no reason to doubt his wisdom in venturing into corporate ownership,
even if only for short-term speculation. There were virtually no voices
raised until after the debacle of 1929 to contest the virtues of
37
participation in this best of all possible markets.

While the inevitable investigations followed the debacle of
October 1929,38 it took the next presidential election to frame the

33.
34.

Id.
Id.

35. H.R. 188, introduced by Congressman Edward Taylor of Colorado in
1919, "was based on the disclosure principle, and made corporate officers liable
for losses suffered by virtue of material misrepresentation in the securities
offered." Id. at 5. In the same year, Congressman Andrew Volstead of
Minnesota introduced a bill that "would have given the Attorney General the
power to determine whether securities might be fraudulent." Id. Neither bill
made it to the floor of the House. In 1922, Congressman Edward Denison of
Illinois introduced a bill aimed at those who used the mails or interstate
agencies to circumvent the state blue-sky laws, and was to be enforced by the
Department of Justice. Fines and imprisonment were imposed on violators, and
provision was made for recovery of damages suffered by the security purchaser.
... Although successful in passing the House, the Denison Bill died in Senate
committee.
Id. at 6.
36.
Id. 'The 'odd-lot' houses-those brokers who deal solely in stock purchases
of less than one hundred shares-reported a phenomenal increase for this period." Id.
at 6-7. In addition, "1loans of brokers for the purchase of stock on margin advanced
from $3 million in February, 1927, to nearly $7 million in February, 1929." Id. at 7.
An additional source of funds that aided yet more purchasers to take part in
the pursuit of easy riches appeared in the form of corporate surplus. Surging
into the market place in the late 1920's, these funds frequently represented
proceeds of security issues diverted from their original or ostensible purpose of
production expansion. Instead, they were channeled into broker's loans in order
to profit from rates ranging up to 15 percent.
Id.
37.
Id.
38.
"The financial experts of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency
concluded that the losses of investors even before the depression reached a staggering
annual total of $1.7 billion." Id. at 11. "[L]ater computations estimated that in the ten

408

VANDERBIL TJOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[VOL. 38.397

issues for legislative purposes. While President Hoover saw "doubtful
constitutional authority for (a federal law regulating the sale of
securities], ' 39 Governor Roosevelt proposed three concrete remedies:
[F]irst, "truth telling" concerning the stock to be issued, and pertinent
facts concerning the issuing corporation itself; second, Federal
regulation of holding companies that sell securities in interstate
commerce; and third, the use of Federal authority in the regulation of
40
stock and commodities exchanges.

Specifically, he envisioned legislation relating to both "better
supervision of the purchase and sale of all property dealt in on the
exchanges" and the correction of "unethical and unsafe practices on
the part of officers and directors of banks and other corporations."'"
C. Chronology of Disclosure and Reporting Legislation: 1933-present
Following considerable debate and many drafts,4 2 the Securities
Act of 1933 became the first federal statute enacted in the U.S. in the
field of securities regulation. Its focus was on the initial issuance of
securities. In addition to registration requirements, the Securities Act
contains express antifraud provisions. Section 12 prohibits oral or
written misstatements of material facts or omissions of material facts
necessary to prevent express statements from being misleading in the
circumstances in which they were made.4 3 Section 17 makes it
unlawful for any person to use the mails or interstate commerce to
employ any device or scheme to defraud another person or to engage
in any transaction, practice, or course of business that defrauds of
deceives the purchaser. 44 Section 11 is the corresponding liability
provision, imposing civil liability for any registration statement that
contains untrue statements of material fact or omissions of material
facts that would make the registration statement misleading in the
circumstances in which a purchaser buys the securities.4 5 Section 11
liability is directed at every person who signs the registration

years before 1933, total investor losses through worthless securities were
approximately $25 billion, or half of all those issued." Id.
39.
Id. at 26.
40.
Id. at 26-27.
41.
Id. at 33-34. Such proposed legislation clearly embodied the fiscal
philosophy of Justice Brandeis:
What we seek is a return to a clearer understanding of the ancient truth that
those who manage banks, corporations, and other agencies handling or using
other people's money are trustees acting for others.
Id. at 34.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. at 34-54.
Securities Act of 1933 § 12, 15 U.S.C. § 77(1) (2000).
15 U.S.C. § 77(q).
15 U.S.C. § 77(k).
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statement; every person who is a director or identified in the
registration statement as about to become a director; every
accountant, engineer, appraiser, or any other professional expert
whose statement or report appears in the registration statement; and
every underwriter. 46 But all such persons, except the issuer,47 may
escape liability by showing that they acted with "due diligence.
A year later, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was enacted to
regulate the secondary distribution of securities. 48 That statute's
jurisdiction extends to the registration and distribution of securities
national securities
through the national stock exchanges,
associations, and brokers and dealers; it also covers proxy
solicitations of registered securities, regulates tender offers, limits
insider trading, forbids short-swing profits, and tries to eliminate
conduct generally with respect to the sale or
fraud and manipulative
49
purchase of securities.
The 1933 Act radically changed the ability of the stockholder to
sue. Under it, a claim may be based on an alleged false statement or
0
misleading omission in the company's financial statements.5 Section
10(b) of the 1934 Act also makes unlawful any manipulative or
deceptive device used through the mails or in interstate commerce in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security. 51 Rule 10b-5,
promulgated in 1942, augments section 10(b) by providing for liability
for any fraudulent or deceitful activity that involves misleading
a
material facts or omissions of material facts that would make 52
statement misleading in the circumstances in which it was made.
Remedies available under the 1933 and 1934 Acts were augmented in
198453 and 198854 specifically with respect to insider trading; they

15 U.S.C. § 77(k).
46.
See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 382 (1983).
47.
The 1934 Act followed further exposure of improper and fraudulent
48.
transactions by brokers and company officials, described in some detail by Professor de
Bedts in chapter 3 of his book. DE BEDTS, supra note 20, at 56-85.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 19, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (2003).
49.
15 U.S.C. § 77(1).
50.
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
51.
Rule 10b-5 provides:
52.
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of
any national securities exchange, (a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice
to defraud, (b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or (c)
to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10(b)(5).
See Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-3768, 98 Stat.
53.
1264. The Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 penalizes insider traders up to three
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were further reformed in 1995 with respect to misleading "forward
55
looking" statements.
D. Historical Context for IncreasingPersonalAccountability of
CorporateOfficers
Since the CEO certification requirement is an extension of the
SEC's path toward imposing greater accountability on specific
corporate insiders, it is important to review the political history of
this subject.
The enactment of the 1933 and 1934 Acts, and their progeny,
initiated a significant change in the exposure of corporate officers and
those acting on their behalf. One commentator described these
enactments as "consumer legislation . . . intended to shift the burdens
and the detriments of an inferior product from the buyer to the

times the amount of the profit gained or the loss avoided as a result of the unlawful
purchase or sale. The Act does not expand opportunities for private recovery, however;
the penalties are payable to the U.S. Treasury. The Act also increases the criminal
penalties that can be levied against individual violators form $10,000 to $100,000.
See Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L.
54.
No. 100-704, 102 Stat. 4677 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. § 78 (Supp.
1988)). The Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 creates an
express private right of action in favor of any market participants who traded
contemporaneously with those who violated the 1934 Act or SEC rules by trading while
in possession of material, nonpublic information. The Act limits the damages one can
receive in such private actions to the profits gained or losses avoided by the illegal
trading, less any disgorgement ordered in an SEC action brought under the 1984 Act.
The 1988 Act also allows private individuals who provide information that leads to the
imposition of penalties to receive a bounty of up to ten percent of any penalty.
55.
See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67,
109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). The 1995 Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act attempted to reassert legislative control over
securities fraud litigation. Its "safe harbor" provision, Section 27A, tries to encourage
corporate executives to offer investors more meaningful information by exempting from
liability filed registration documents containing certain types of forward-looking
statements (e.g., projections of revenues, income, earnings per share, and company
plans or objectives relating to certain products or services) by certain issuers and
underwriters. Daniel V. Davidson et al. explained:
To fall within the available safe harbor, a forward-looking statement (either
oral or written) should be accompanied by meaningful cautionary statements
identifying important factors that would cause actual results to differ
materially from those projected in the forward-looking statements. Registration
statements consisting of traditional "boiler-plate" language in which the
issuer's purported cautionary statements mention "lack of demand," "an
increase in competition," and so on, presumably would not suffice. But
information relating to the issuer's business that discusses the possible loss of a
major customer or a serious glitch in the development of technology for a
product in the proto-type stage would fulfill the statutory requirements for a
"meaningful cautionary statement."
DANIEL V. DAVIDSON ET AL., BUSINESS LAW 1012 (7th ed. 2001).
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56

In so doing, they were consistent with broader legal trends both
"shifting the burden of care onto the one who can do something to
prevent a loss to the consumer" and "increasingly 'socializ[ing]' the
risks and harms that are an inevitable concomitant of living in a
civilized and industrialized society. '6
Rule 10b-5 started life as a "seemingly innocuous rule . . .
intended to do nothing more than apprehend a greedy corporate
officer who was committing fraud in the purchase of securities at a
time when the statutory scheme somewhat shortsightedly imagined
that frauds only existed in the context of sales. 58 But "the ingenuity
of private counsel and the responsiveness of the courts to the plight of
those defrauded in private securities transactions ...

into a potent tool for seeking private redress.

59

transformed [it]

The history of the judicial development of the Rule's implications has
largely been the story of the erection of barriers to undue extension of
the Rule followed by a dismantling of the barriers. The courts have
assiduously sought to relate common-law concepts to the Rule and
interpret it in their light: privity, scienter, negligence, reliance,
causation. Some of these, particularly privity and scienter in the narrow
common-law sense of "guilty knowledge" or intent, have been discarded:
the defendant need not have been in a transaction with the plaintiff,
and it has become established that simple negligence may give rise to
an action .... 60

As usually happens to the regulatory pendulum, an excessive
swing in one direction will eventually be corrected. While the early
cases greatly expanded liability under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5,
the Supreme Court eventually began to pull in the reins by requiring
a private party to prove that the securities law violator intended to
deceive, manipulate, or defraud the injured party. 6 1 Soon thereafter,
the Supreme Court also held that the term fraud in Section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 does not cover management's breach of fiduciary duties in
connection with a securities transaction. 62 An early foray by the law

56.

A.A. Sommer, Jr., The Accountant's Changing Legal Environment, in

CORPORATE FINANCIAL REPORTING 87, 89 (1972).

57.
58.
59.
60.

Id.
Id. at 93.
Id. at 103.
Id. at 104. Sommer noted:

Out of this came dramatic reinforcement of the transcending theme of
disclosure, echoed often to the exclusion of its limitations. The Exchanges
published guide-lines for disclosure. The Commission importuned the business
community to make a practice of prompt and complete disclosure. Analysts' and
institutional investors' demands for more reliable information grew.
Id. at 93.
61.
62.

Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976).
Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473-74 (1977).
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and economics school into the assessment of the effectiveness of the
securities laws suggested that "the accounting disclosure
requirements of the securities acts [were] an unwarranted imposition
on corporations and investors, despite the good intentions of
legislators and honest and conscientious administration by the
[SEC] ."63 This position is echoed by a recent study complaining about
the cost of corporate governance rules stemming from the Sarbanes64
Oxley Act.
Another issue the courts have had to address concerns when
information subject to disclosure under the securities laws is
important enough to be considered "material." Courts have tied
materiality to the significance that the reasonable investor would
place on the withheld or misrepresented information. If there is a
substantial likelihood that a disclosure of omitted or misrepresented
facts would have been viewed as significant by a reasonable investor,
65
the information is material.
Finally, the courts have had an effect on who is liable for
violations of the securities laws. Liability has attached to the
activities of nearly anyone considered to be a corporate insiderincluding directors, officers, controlling shareholders, employees,
lawyers, accountants, bankers, consultants, and anyone else with
access to material inside information that could affect the price of the
subject stock. Before 1980, the prevailing expansive view of whom the
"insiders" were included even those who purchased or sold stock
based on tips provided directly or indirectly by directors, officers, and
the like. But the U.S. Supreme Court appears to have limited the
scope of "insiders" by excluding a printer working for a firm that

63.

George J. Benston, The Effectiveness and Effects of the SEC's Accounting

Disclosure Requirements, in ECONOMIC POLICY AND THE REGULATION OF CORPORATE

SECURITIES 23, 76 (Henry G. Manne ed., 1969).
One hopes that the present administrators of the securities laws would
remember the spirit in which the acts were drawn. . . . Congress passed a
disclosure statute that allows investors to decide for themselves whether or not
to purchase a security. Consistent with this approach, corporations could be
allowed to decide the type and form of information they will publish so long as
they disclosed their standard of disclosure to investors.
Id.
64.

The Wall Street Journal reported:

A survey of 321 companies [released on February 10, 2004] shows that
businesses with more than $5 billion in revenue expect to spend an average of
$4.7 million each implementing the new 404 rule this year ....

Much of the

money is being spent on consultants, lawyers, auditors and new software.
Deborah Solomon & Cassell Bryan-Low, Companies Complain About Cost of CorporateGovernanceRules, WALL ST. J., Feb. 10, 2004, at Al.
65.
See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231-32 (1988) (adopting the
standard set forth in TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)).
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printed takeover bids who, without disclosing his knowledge, bought
stock in the target companies and then sold the stock when the
takeover attempts became public knowledge. 66 In a later case, the
Court held that liability may be avoided by those receiving
investment tips from insiders who have divulged material inside
67
information for reasons other than personal gain.
E. The Evolution of CorporateAbuses and the FCPA and SOA
Just as the SEC's origins and formative years reflected "the
financial and political happenings of the times ... in relationship to
the many individuals involved," 6 8 so have its functions and scope
continued to evolve based on successive iterations of corrupt behavior.
It is important to remember that the SEC is responsible not only for
protecting the investor, but also for institutionalizing the
"democratization and social control of the world of finance." 69 This
dual function is reflected in, and supplemented by, judicial
development of the concept of "fraud on the market," which permits
recovery by plaintiffs who concededly did not read the fraudulent
that
statement, 70 and which eliminates individual issues of 7reliance
1
would make securities-fraud class-actions impracticable.
The cycles of reactions to business chicanery during several
centuries, recounted above, reveal that when the outcry becomes loud
enough, the legislative branch is forced to "do something" in response.
In the interval between crises, the applicable administrative organin this case, the SEC-carries out its functions either expansively or
conservatively, depending on the appointing administration and
surrounding circumstances, and within its legislatively delegated
framework. In recent years in particular, the acceleration of
globalization has led to the enactment of the FCPA, which extended
the SEC's role to the internal management of domestic corporations
relative to their international dealings. Recent abuses have continued
this trend of SEC attention to internal management. 72 Even more

According to the Court, he was not a corporate insider, a fiduciary, or a
66.
tippee; rather, he was a complete stranger who dealt with the sellers only through
impersonal market transactions. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 232-33
(1980).

67.

Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 662 (1983).

68.

DE BEDTS, supra note 20, at vii.

Id. at viii.
69.
70.
Thereby effectuating the economic theory embedded in the "efficient capital
market hypothesis," which holds that "in free and actively traded markets, stock prices
reflect fully all available information about the value of a corporation." Barbara Black,
The Strange Case of Fraud on the Market: A Label in Search of a Theory, 52 ALB. L.
REV. 923, 927-28 (1988).
Id.
71.
For example, mutual fund manager abuses have led the SEC to require
72.
managers of mutual funds to report personal investments in their funds, obtain
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recently, taped conversations in which energy traders gloated about
"cheating 'poor grandmothers,"' suggested "shutting down a power
plant in order to drive up electricity prices," and shouted 'burn baby,
burn' . . . [upon] hearing of a fire under a transmission line that
caused a power failure" 73 led to a focus on the personal accountability
of CEOs in the SOA.
In what follows, the Authors test de Bedts' contention that the
actions and experience relative to legislative remedies resulting from
one series of scandals have no connection and no continuity with
subsequent efforts. 74 More specifically, the Authors examine whether
any lessons can be drawn from the relevant sections of the FCPA that
would suggest how effective the SOA's corresponding provisions for
deterring fraudulent and unethical behavior will be.

III. THE SIMILARITY OF CORPORATE REPORTING ISSUES AND THE
LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE TO THE WATERGATE SLUSH FUND DEBACLE
AND RECENT ACCOUNTING FRAUD SCANDALS

In estimating the likely success of the CEO certification
provisions to deter accounting misconduct by corporate officers, one
should look at the FCPA, which provides a quarter of a century of
valuable history concerning this issue. The internal accounting
provisions in the FCPA changed the mandate of the SEC by giving
the agency, for the first time, the means for regulating the internal
management of domestic corporations. The accounting provisions
broadly include all dealings of an issuer without regard to whether
those dealings are "foreign" or "corrupt. '75 The fine-tuning of the
regulation of internal management was accomplished with
amendments to the FCPA in 1988 and 1998.76 Finally, in 2002,
Congress adopted the SOA-a further effort to deter insidious
accounting misconduct by imposing criminal penalties on corporate
officers for willful and knowing violations of the certification

clearance before making personal investments in initial public offerings and limited
offerings, and report violations of ethics rules to company compliance officers, general
counsels, or other designated officials. Carrie Johnson, SEC Wants Disclosures From
Funds-New Rules Focus on Managers,Discounts, WASH. POST, May 27, 2004, at E01.
73.
Enron's Awesome Cynicism, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 2004, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/06/opinion/06SUN4.html.
74.

See generally DE BEDTS, supra note 20.

75.
See The Business Accounting and Foreign Trade Simplification Act: Joint
Hearings on §708 Before the Subcomm. on Securities and the Subcomm. on Int'l Fin.
and Monetary Policy of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs,
97th Cong. 344 (1981).
76.
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 100-418, §§ 5001-5003, 102 Stat.
1415 (1988) (enacted as part of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988,
Pub. L. No. 100-418, §§1001-10013, 102 Stat. 1107); International Anti-Bribery and
Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-366, §§ 001-0006, 112 Stat. 3302.
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requirements.
A. ReportingIssues in and the Legislative Response to the Watergate
Slush Fund Debacle Resulting in Passage of the Foreign Corrupt
PracticesAct
The catalyst for the FCPA's passage was accounting
misconduct-namely, off-the-book accounts and double bookkeeping
used to hide from boards of directors and outside auditors two kinds
of wrongdoing: (1) the corporate bribery of foreign officials to obtain
contracts and (2) the under-the-table funding of contributions to
domestic politicians in violation of campaign finance laws. 77 Congress
sought to deter corporations from bribing foreign officials to obtain
contracts by using a bifurcated approach. First, it criminalized
bribery. 78 Second, it imposed civil liability, by amending the
Securities Act of 1934, to require recordkeeping 79 and internal
controls" ° to deter slush funds, illegal bribes, and other forms of
financial misconduct.
1. The Faulty Accounting Systems Used by U.S. Corporations in the
Watergate Scandal
During the Nixon-Watergate crisis, the Special Prosecutor
discovered that some of the U.S.'s largest companies made illegal
campaign contributions to President Richard Nixon.8 1 In the course
of the investigation, information was uncovered that many of these
companies were bribing foreign officials to obtain contracts.8 2 The
companies were hiding the transactions by using slush funds, double
bookkeeping, and off-the-books accounts-the same basic guiding
principle of the Enron era (albeit without the same motivation)-to
keep certain items off balance sheets and to provide a veil of
83
secrecy.
Boeing Aircraft Co., McDonnell Douglas Corp., and Lockheed

77.
(2003).
78.
79.
80.

See Walter Perkel, Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 683
15 U.S.C. § 78dd(l)-(2).
15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2).
15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2).

81.
GEORGE GREANIAS & DUANE WINSOR, THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES
ACT 22 (1982).

John F. Berry & William H. Jones, Boxes of Boxes of SEC Documents
82.
Reveal Secret Dealings, WASH. POST, May 18, 1977, at Al.
83.
Enron's Chief Financial Officer, Fastow, boasted that he had used the
partnerships to keep nearly $1 billion of debt off Enron's balance sheet that, he said,
was the key to maintaining the firm's triple-B-plus credit rating. Also, hundreds of
offshore companies served as a "parking lot" for debt that management wanted to keep
off the corporate books. See Charles Gasparino, Moody's Trains Eye on Data Off the
Sheet, WALL ST. J., Jan. 21, 2002, at A2.
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Corp. entered into consent decrees in 1978 in which they admitted
that between 1970 and 1975, they had made "questionable" payments
84
overseas to induce foreign governments to buy their airplanes.
Lockheed, Boeing, and McDonnell Douglas each admitted making
bribes, kickbacks, and payoffs totaling, respectively, $38 million, $52
million, and $3 million. Lockheed caused the greatest outcry because
Congress, in 1971, authorized a $250 million loan guarantee to
prevent Lockheed from going into bankruptcy.
In addition to the contributions to the Nixon campaign, Lockheed
paid bribes of more than $1 million to Prince Bernhard, the husband
of Queen Juliana of the Netherlands; $1.7 million to Kakeui Tanaka,
former premier of Japan; more than $7 million to Yoshio Kodama, a
Japanese militarist with powerful political connections; $2 million to
Italian officials; and scores of lesser amounts to eight different
85
countries, including Germany, Mexico, Spain, and Greece.
2. "Voluntary Disclosure Program" Before the Adoption of the FCPA
The magnitude of the corruption in these cases created
overwhelming pressure on the SEC to bring a sufficient number of
86
enforcement cases in order to end the troublesome practices.
Stanley Sporkin, a CPA and an attorney who at the time headed the
SEC's recently created Enforcement Division, established a
"voluntary disclosure program" that allowed an issuer to conduct an
internal investigation of its foreign payments, adopt a policy of
ceasing such payments, and file a report concerning these matters
with the SEC. 87 In exchange for voluntary compliance, the
commission agreed not to prosecute those issuers who reported the
88
results of their investigations.
Approximately six hundred corporations voluntarily disclosed
acts of domestic and foreign bribery, the falsification of records, and
illegal campaign contributions. 89 The voluntary disclosures revealed
that some of the largest and most prestigious corporations were

84.
Lockheed Aircraft Corp., [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) P95,509 (D.D.C. 1976); see Carole Shifrin, Aircraft Firms Find Agreement on
Payments, WASH. POST, Aug. 19, 1978, at C8.
85.
Michael Ruby et al., How Clean is Business?, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 1, 1975; see
Barbara C. George & Mary J. Dundas, Responsibilities of Domestic Corporate
Management Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 31 SYRACUSE L. REV. 868 n.6
(1984); see also Kathleen A. Lacey & Barbara C. George, Expansion of SEC Authority
into Internal Corporate Governance: The Accounting Provisions of the Foreign Corrupt
PracticesAct (A Twentieth Anniversary Review), 7 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 119, 128
(1998).
86.
ROBERTA S. KARMEL, REGULATION BY PROSECUTION 149 (1982).
87.
Id.
88.
Id.
89.
See "--GOOD PEOPLE, IMPORTANT PROBLEMS AND WORKABLE LAWS": 50
YEARS OF THE U. S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 64 (1984).
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dispensing enormous sums to bribe foreign businesses in order to
90
obtain contracts.
After the extent of the bribery was discovered, the SEC's first
priority was to remedy the deficiencies in the legal system that
allowed secret slush funds and other off-the-books accounting
techniques. Accounting misconduct of this kind undermined the
integrity of corporate books and records, an essential element of the
reporting system administered by the SEC.
The SEC again faced the same problem in the Enron era. As the
enormousness of the accounting fraud was revealed with Enron's
bankruptcy in December 2001 and WorldCom's bankruptcy in June
2002, the integrity of all corporate books and records was again
undermined, causing the SEC to resort to either prosecuting
wrongdoers or creating an incentive for wrongdoers to take corrective
action. On June 27, 2002, the SEC issued an order requiring the
CEOs or CFOs of 945 companies to certify personally that their most
recently filed financial statements were complete and accurate.
Similar to the situation under the FCPA outlined above, this order
was issued before the adoption of the SOA; but unlike the situation
under the FCPA, the deadline was subsequent to the adoption of the
SOA. The purpose of the filing was slightly different in the two cases.
The SEC under the FCPA wanted to identify the number of possibly
guilty corporations as a means of gathering information on the extent
of the accounting fraud so that it could use the information to
pressure Congress to make greater inroads into internal corporate
governance. But in the Enron era more than twenty-five years later,
the leverage for greater corporate disclosure and officer accountability
had already been achieved and was no longer necessary.
3. The Anti-Bribery and Accounting Provisions of the FCPA
Although the FCPA provides a two-track system 91 that includes
(1) the anti-bribery sections of the Act covered in sections 10392 and
10493 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and (2) the relevant
provisions pertinent to this Article that are found in section 102, the
accounting section 94 of the FCPA, applicable only to SEC-registered
foreign and domestic95 "issuers." Section 102 was passed as a part of

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
foreign or
SPRONK,

Ruby et al., supra note 85.
15 U.S.C. § 78 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd(1)-(2) (2004).
15 U.S.C. § 78dd(2).
15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2).
As one writer has described it, a U.S. company does not have to be either
corrupt to come within the scope of the accounting sections. See LAMBERT
THE FINANCIAL

CORPORATIONS 264 (1980).

EXECUTIVE

HANDBOOK FOR MANAGING
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a series of amendments to the Securities Exchange Act of 193496 and
applies to all corporations covered by the 1934 Act, whether engaged
in domestic business, international business, or a combination
thereof.97 Its provisions represent an attempt to control the problem
of illicit payments disguised through improper accounting procedures
by corporations within the SEC's jurisdiction.
Relevant to the comparison between the FCPA and the SOA are
the penalties that are imposed for violations. Penalties for the willful
violation of the FCPA include a criminal fine of up to $100,000 on
directors, officers, stockholders, employees, or agents, 98 with the
possibility of five years' imprisonment. 99 To ensure the personal
responsibility of corporate officers and directors, the FCPA specifies
that fines cannot be paid directly or indirectly by the companies
through indemnification policies.' 0 0 In comparison, SOA increases the
fines to $500,000-$1,000,000 for CEOs and CFOs who certify false
financial statements and also doubles the prison term to five to ten
l0
years.'
4. The Statutory Language That Expanded the Role of the SEC
The accounting provisions of the FCPA require every issuer of
10 2
registered securities to:
A. [M]ake and keep books, records, and accounts which, in reasonable
detail, accurately and fairly reflect transactions and dispositions of
assets.
B. [D]evise and maintain a system of internal accounting controls
sufficient to provide reasonable assurances that:
i. transactions are executed in accordance with management's general
or specific authorization;
ii. transactions are recorded as necessary to permit preparation of
financial statements in conformity with generally accepted accounting
principles, or any other applicable criteria, and to maintain
accountability for assets;
iii. access to assets is permitted only in accordance with management's
general or specific authorization; and the recorded accountability for
assets is compared with the existing assets at reasonable intervals and

96.
15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2).
97.
15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2).
98.
15 U.S.C. § 78 dd(2)(g)(2)(A) (1977).
99.
15 U.S.C. § 78dd(2)(g)(2)(A)-(B) (1997).
100.
15 U.S.C. § 78dd(2)(g)(3).
101.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 906, 116 Stat. 745
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 7201 (2005)).
102.
15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2). Section 102 of the FCPA imposes these requirements
on every company having a class of securities registered pursuant to section 12 of the
1934 Act and every company required to file regular disclosure reports under section
15(d) of the 1934 Act.
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The accounting provisions of the 1977 Act were thoroughly
evaluated and discussed by the judiciary for the first time in SEC v.
World-Wide Coin Inv., Ltd.10 4 The case is significant because it is the
first in which the accounting provisions were litigated completely
through the trial phase.10 5 The independent auditors, and later the
court, commented on the weaknesses of the defendant's case, which
included (1) no adequate segregation of duties, (2) no documentation
to support transactions, and (3) accounting records that were
inadequate and improperly filed. Despite notice of these deficiencies
and possible FCPA violations by the auditor in the opinion letter
accompanying the financial statements, World-Wide management
took no corrective action.
Judge Vining's opinion noted that "the more significant addition
of the FCPA is the accounting control's provision, which gives the
SEC authority over the entire financial management and reporting
requirements of publicly held United States Corporations."'10 6 The
court also discussed the necessity of accurate recordkeeping as a
mechanism to promote management accountability. The World-Wide
court divided its analysis of the corporation's potential violations
between the two relevant sections of the Act: Section 13(b)(2)(A),
which governs the recordkeeping requirements, and Section
13(b)(2)(B), which details the Act's internal control requirements.
In assessing the original Act's recordkeeping provisions, which
are aligned with the CEO certification requirement, World- Wide
enumerated three basic objectives of Section 13(b)(2)(A):
(1) books and records should reflect transactions in conformity with
accepted methods of reporting economic events, (2) misrepresentations,
concealment, falsification, circumvention and other deliberate acts
resulting in inaccurate financial books and records are unlawful and (3)
transactions should be properly reflected on books and records in such a
manner as to permit the preparation of financial statements in
107
conformity with GAAP.

103.
15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2). It should be noted that although there have been two
major revisions of the FCPA in 1988 and 1998, the basic accounting provisions have
essentially remained the same.
567 F. Supp. 724 (N.D. Ga. 1983) (finding the defendant corporation, its
104.
majority owner and CEO, and its other officers to be in violation of Section 13(b) of the
FCPA).
Very few cases have been brought under the accounting provisions of the
105.
FCPA. See Gary P. Naftalis, The Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct, WHITE COLLAR CRIME
REP., Sept. 1997, at 1.
World-Wide Coin, 567 F. Supp. at 724.
106.
107.
Id. at 748.
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B. Reporting Issues in and the Legislative Response to Recent
Accounting FraudScandals Resulting in the Passageof the
Sarbanes-OxleyAct
1. The Faulty Accounting Systems Used by Enron
The Enron scandal in 2001 and the alleged financial fraud of
HealthSouth in 2003 point to the central problem of corporate
accountability: the issuance of 'corporate financial reports that
artificially inflate the value of corporate stock through fraudulent or
manipulative bookkeeping. The Enron scandal involved a "systemic
failure"1 08 whereby the company overstated its profits by more than
$580 million from 1997 to 2001, used complex partnerships to keep
$586 million in debt off its books, and consequently masked its
financial problems in order to continue to get cash and credit to run
its trading business.1 0 9 In the months following Enron's financial
collapse and the indictment of its accounting firm, Arthur Andersen,
a series of corporate accounting scandals within major firms such as
WorldCom, 1 10 Adelphia, 111 and others occurred. These scandals
further eroded investor confidence both in the securities markets and
in the corporate financial statements. Congress, the SEC, and the
accounting profession fell under tremendous public pressure to
address and resolve the perceived shortcomings in the accounting and
financial reporting system and to cultivate an atmosphere of good
corporate governance. Consequently, both Congress and the SEC in
recent months have mandated new accounting and financialstatement reporting requirements in response to the pressures for
112
reform.

The multilayered system of checks and balances failed to work. From the
108.
outside monitors, like regulators, financial analysts, credit-rating agencies, the media,
and Congress, to the internal watchdogs constituted by the Board of Directors,
accountants, and lawyers, no one or group of them stopped the implosion. Richard W.
Stevenson & Jeff Gerth, Collapse of Enron Exposes 'Regulatory Black Hole', INT'L
HERALD TRIB., Jan. 21, 2002, at 1; see also George F. Will, 'Events, Dear Boy, Events,'
NEWSWEEK., Jan. 28, 2002, at 64.
109.
Greg Miller, Enron Collapse Based on Economics, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 21,
2002, at A14.
Walter Hamilton & Debora Vrana, Most Firms Certify Books, L.A. TIMES,
110.
Aug. 15, 2002, at A2; P.J. Huffstutter, WorldCom Hit With Federal Fraud Lawsuit,
L.A. TIMES, June 27, 2002, at Al. WorldCom announced in June 2002 that it made a
$3.9 billion accounting misstatement, further diminishing investor confidence in the
securities markets.
111.
Nona Yates, What Went Wrong?, L.A. TIMES, June 27, 2002, at Al.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, §§ 303, 906, 116 Stat. 745
112.
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 7201 (2005)); SEC File No. 4-460: Order Requiring
the Filing of Sworn Statements Pursuant to Section 21(a)(1) of the Securities Exchange
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The new certification requirements are currently at issue in the
corporate scandal of HealthSouth. In March 2003, the SEC filed a
civil complaint against HealthSouth and its founder and CEO,
Richard Scrushy, alleging that a $1.4 billion overstatement of
earnings occurred because of the flagrant "fixing" of the earnings
reports to ensure that HRC "met or exceeded expectations established
by Wall Street analysts."'1 13 Both the new certification requirements
and the HealthSouth case are evaluated below.
2. The SEC Order Requiring Certification of Existing Financial
Statements Before the Adoption of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
On June 27, 2002, as a result of the corporate scandals of Enron
and others, the SEC issued an order requiring the CEOs or CFOs of
945 companies to certify personally, in writing and under oath, that
their most recent financial reports filed with the SEC were complete
and accurate. 114 As noted by SEC Chairman Harvey L. Pitt, "[t]his is
an unprecedented step to help restore investor confidence."' 115 The
purpose of the order was to reassure investors and the capital
markets that the corporate financial disclosures already filed with the
SEC were in compliance with all relevant federal securities laws and
that there would be no other unpleasant surprises, such as the
restatements of earnings by Enron or WorldCom. 116 The pertinent
officers were required either to certify under oath that the company's
most recent periodic financial reports were materially truthful or to
explain why the reports were incorrect. 117 The 945 targeted
corporations, which included HealthSouth, each reported revenues of
more than $1.2 billion. 1i 8 Corporate officers were given until August
14, 2002 to file their certifications."19 At the time, some due process
concerns were expressed regarding the certification order; these are
discussed in greater detail later below in this Article.
Nonetheless, by the August deadline most company officers had
filed the necessary certification. 120 Most executives were justifiably
worried that not filing by the deadline or challenging the legal

Act of 1934 (June 27, 2002) [hereinafter SEC Order] available at http://www.sec.gov/
rules/other/4-460.htm.
113.
SEC v. HealthSouth Corp., No. CV-03-J-0615-S (N.D. Ala., Mar. 19, 2003).
SEC Order, supranote 112.
114.
Press Release, SEC, SEC Publishes List of Companies Whose Officers Are
115.
Ordered to Certify Accuracy and Completeness of Recent Annual Reports, Release No.
220-96 (June 28, 2002), availableat http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2002-115.htm.
Id.
116.
Id.
117.
118.
Id.
119.
Id.
120.
John D. McKinnon & Kelly K. Spors, Firms Rush to Meet Deadline by SEC
to Certify Statements, WALL ST. J., Aug. 16, 2002, at A2.
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authority of the SEC to issue such an order could lead to an angry
public reaction and reduce the market value of their companies'
respective securities. 121 Certain firms, such as Nicor and Bristol122
Myers Squibb, issued restatements of earnings.
3. Sarbanes-Oxley: Section 302's Certification Requirement
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, enacted by Congress and signed into
law by President George W. Bush on July 30, 2002, comprehensively
restructures corporate financial reporting requirements and reduces
the self-regulation that the accounting profession had previously
enjoyed. In April 2002, the Republican-controlled House of
Representatives approved a public accounting reform bill that was
supported by the accounting industry. 123 As other accounting
scandals, such as WorldCom, were publicly announced in the months
following the House bill, an "unstoppable momentum" of public loss of
confidence in U.S. securities markets caused Congress to undertake
decisive action. 124 As noted by one commentator, "the bill is a
watershed event, the biggest thing to come down from a corporate law
standpoint in [the] 70 years" since the 1933 and 1934 Acts were
1 25
passed.
One of the most relevant provisions for the purposes of this
Article is Section 302, which requires chief corporate executives to
certify their companies' quarterly and annual financial reports that
are filed with the SEC. 126 The CEO or CFO must issue a statement
that accompanies the financial statements, certifying that those
financial statements "fairly present in all material respects the
financial condition of the issuer" 12 7 and that the report "does not
contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements not
misleading."'128 In addition, Section 302 holds the signing officers
12 9
it
responsible for establishing and maintaining internal controls;
130
or
also requires that the officers disclose to the auditors any fraud

121.
Kathryn Kranhold & Richard B. Schmitt, Lawyers Question Order That
CEO's Take Oath Over Results, WALL ST. J., July, 22, 2002, at BI.
122.
Id.
Public Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act of 2002, H.R. 3763,
123.
107th Cong. (2002).
124.
Richard Simon & Walter Hamilton, Accounting Reform Bill Gets a Boost,
L.A. TIMES, June 19, 2002, at C1.
See Kathleen Pender, Sarbanes Law Giving Attorneys Indigestion, S. F.
125.
CHRON., Aug. 11, 2002, at G1 (quoting David J. Berger, a partner with Wilson Sonsini).
302, 116 Stat. 745
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204,
126.
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 7201 (2005)).
Sarbanes.Oxley Act § 302(a)(3).
127.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 302(a)(2).
128.
129.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 302(a)(4)(A).
130.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 302(a)(5)(B).
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provision
deficiencies in the internal controls.' 3 1 A violation of this
32
must be knowing and intentional to give rise to liability.'
These provisions are a direct response to the Enron collapse and
other corporate scandals that involved fraud, deficient internal
controls, and misleading financial statements. Section 302 is also
intended to diminish the "no idea" defense often asserted by officers
who are investigated by the SEC and the Department of Justice for
corporate fraud. 133 Officers cannot assert that they had no idea about
the fraud, misleading statements, or other problems because they are
required to certify the financial reports.' 3 4 Also, this defense is
rendered moot because the officer must have internal controls in
place that ensure that pertinent material information reaches the top
echelons of management. 13 5 As is discussed below, and as is
interpreted by the SEC in implementing the statute, the internal
exceed historical internal accounting
control requirements far
36
controls under the FCPA.'
4. Sarbanes-Oxley: Section 906's Certification Requirement
To complicate further the certification issue, the SOA has a
second certification requirement in Section 906.13 7 This provision
requires the CEO or CFO to sign a separate statement certifying that
the periodic financial reports "fully comply with the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. '' 138 Corporate officers must, to their
knowledge, "state that the financial statements and disclosures fully
comply with provisions of the Securities Exchange Act and that they
fairly present, in all material respects, the operations and financial
condition of the issuer.' 3 9 Conviction under this section of the statute
requires proof of a willful or knowing violation. 140 The penalty for
filing a knowingly false certification is significant: a $1 million fine,
10 years' imprisonment, or both. 141 For a willful violation, the penalty
1 42
is a $5 million fine, 20 years' imprisonment, or both.

131.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 302(a)(5)(A).
132.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 302.
Richard Clayton & Trip Mackintosh, Corporate Governance: Avoiding
133.
Criminal Liability Under Sarbanes-Oxley, LAW OUT WEST (2002), available at
http://library.lp.findlaw.comlarticles/file/00318/008546/title/Subject/topic/Corporations.
Id.
134.
135.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 302(a)(4)-(5).
136.
Clayton & Mackintosh, supra note 133.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 906.
137.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 906(a).
138.
139.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 906(a).
140.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 906(c).
Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 906(c)(1).
141.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 906(c)(2).
142.
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5. SEC Rules Implementing the Provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
On August 27, 2002, the SEC adopted amended rules, effective
two days later, that implemented the CEO certification
requirement. 143 The SEC rules state that the officer must certify that:
a)

he or she reviewed the report

b)

based on his or her knowledge the report does not contain any
untrue statement of material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made not misleading

c)

the financial statements fairly present in all material respects the
financial condition and results of operations of the issuer

d)

he or she is responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure
controls and procedures that ensure material information is made
known to them

e)

he or she has evaluated the effectiveness of the issuer's disclosure
controls within 90 days of the report

f) he or she has disclosed to the issuer's auditors all significant
deficiencies in the design or operation of internal controls
g)

he or she has disclosed any fraud, whether or not material, that
involves management or other employees. 144

The rules require corporate officers to establish internal controls
that exceed existing internal accounting controls by requiring
controls and procedures that supplement those relevant to accounting
and financial matters. The officers must receive information through
the internal control procedures "where the company's activities
intersect with a regulatory control, if violation of that regulation
could have a material effect on the corporation." 14 5 For example,
controls must be established that ensure compliance with all relevant
labor, environmental, and securities regulations, as well as with
146
conflicts of interest rules.
The rules are clearly intended to restore investor confidence in
financial filings. They are very similar to the August 2002 SEC
certification requirements and raise similar concerns regarding the
potential criminal consequences of such certifications for chief
corporate officers.

143.
Press Release, SEC, Commission Approves Rules Implementing Provisions
of Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Accelerating Periodic Filings, and Other Measures, Release No.
2002-128 (Aug. 27, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2002-128.htm;
Certification of Disclosure in Companies' Quarterly and Annual Reports, Exchange Act
Release No. 33-8124 (Aug. 29, 2002).
144.
Certification of Disclosure in Companies' Quarterly and Annual Reports, 17
C.F.R. §§ 228-29, 232, 240, 270, 274 (Aug. 2002).
145.
Clayton & Mackintosh, supra note 133.
146.
Id.
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IV. THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCCESS OF THE CEO CERTIFICATION
PROVISIONS OF SARBANES-OXLEY BASED ON CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES,
EXPERIENCE WITH THE FCPA, AND ADDITIONAL FACTORS

Using the rubric "history repeats itself' as one's premise, it can
reasonably be surmised that, following the usual cyclical pattern,
there will be another business scandal within the next decade
because the SOA has not closed all the loopholes. Certainly, Congress
and the SEC thought the FCPA had closed the loopholes that allowed
companies to create slush funds used to pay bribes. The FCPA thus
provides a good model upon which to try to determine the chances for
success in deterring fraud through the new, stricter accounting
certification requirements.
A. Currently Pending Legal Issues Concerning the Certification
Provisionsof the Sarbanes-OxleyAct That May Negatively Affect Its
Success
1. Potential Due Process Concerns
Some chief corporate officers and the American Bar Association's
securities law committee have raised legitimate legal and due process
objections regarding the mandated certifications under the SEC order
and the SOA. 147 Specifically, the SEC order was adopted without
providing any advance notice or public comment.1 4 s Also, some
attorneys point out that, under the 1934 Act, the SEC can only
require executives at companies under SEC investigation to certify
14 9
their financial statements.
In addition, the legal ramifications of and possible criminal
penalties against officers personally certifying the financial
statements and reports under the requirements of Sections 302 and
906 are ambiguous and potentially too broad, which raises another
potential due process issue. Conceivably, a corporate officer making
such a certification could be confused in regard to when he or she has
engaged in a criminal violation. The business community is concerned
because the legal consequences of such a certification are unclear.
Two potential consequences could be a five to ten year prison term
and a $500,000-$1,000,000 fine for any CEO or CFO who certifies
15 0
false financial statements.
Since CEOs and CFOs must certify that their financial

147.
Kranhold & Schmitt, supra note 121.
Id.
148.
149.
Id.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 906, 116 Stat. 745
150.
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 7201 (2005)).
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statements accurately present "in all material respects" the financial
condition of the corporation, clarity in the definition of "in all material
respects" is crucial, but perhaps lacking. Materiality under the 1934
Act generally has been interpreted to apply to an issue that a
reasonable person would attach importance to when deciding whether
to purchase or sell a security. 151 In generally accepted auditing
standards (GAAS), materiality is defined as "the magnitude of an
omission or misstatement of accounting information that, in the light
of the surrounding circumstances, makes it probable that the
judgment of a reasonable person relying on the information would
152
have been changed or influenced by the omission or misstatement."
These definitions could be interpreted somewhat differently by
individuals, thus blurring the boundary line separating legal and
illegal certifications by CEOs and CFOs under the Act.
Officers might be able to defend themselves under a culpable
participation standard. The standard states that a defendant's
culpability cannot be inferred solely from a signature on a misleading
report, but rather the defendant must have been an active participant
in the fraud. 153 The culpable participation standard has been
established in only a minority of the federal circuit courts 154 and has
not yet been addressed in the specific context of the certification
requirement.
2. The Pending HealthSouth Case
HealthSouth (HRC) is one of the nation's largest and, until
recently, most successful healthcare providers. 155 Headquartered in
Birmingham, Alabama, and founded by CEO Richard Scrushy, HRC
provides outpatient surgery and diagnostic and rehabilitative
healthcare services. 156 In March 2003, the SEC filed a civil complaint
against HRC and Richard Scrushy, alleging that a $1.4 billion
overstatement of earnings occurred because of flagrant "fixing" of the
company's earnings reports to ensure that HRC "met or exceeded

151.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a (1988); see Matter of
Cady, Roberts, & Co., 40 SEC 907, 912 (1961).
152.
See American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, AU Section 312,

Audit Risk and Materiality in Conducting an Audit, AICPA Professional Standards
(June 2001).

Lisa M. Fairfax, Form Over Substance?: Officer Certification and the
153.
Promise of Enhanced Personal Accountability under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 55
RUTGERs L. REV. 1 (Fall 2002).
154.
See Kersh v. Gen. Council of the Assemblies of God, 804 F.2d 546 (9th Cir.
1986); Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175 (3rd Cir. 1981); Lanza v. Drexel &
Co., 479 F.2d 1277 (2nd Cir. 1973).
SEC v. HealthSouth Corp., C.A. No. CV-03-J-0615-S (N.D. Ala., Mar. 19,
155.

2003).
156.

U.S. v. Scrushy, CR.A. No. CR-03-BE-0530-S (indictment at

1).
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' 157
In addition, in
expectations established by Wall Street analysts.
October 2003 a criminal indictment was handed down by the grand
jury against Richard Scrushy for numerous alleged violations of the
securities laws. 158 Of particular relevance to this Article are the
criminal counts 159 and the civil counts alleging certification of false
financial statements in August 2002160 and of the quarterly financial
16 1
This is
reports in November 2002, as required by Sarbanes-Oxley.
one of the first cases that involved the certification requirement as an
integral component of both the criminal and civil allegations.
The SEC complaint and Department of Justice criminal
indictment allege that Scrushy and other HRC executives engaged in
a conspiracy to "cook" HRC's books by falsifying the company's
accounting records in income statement and balance sheet accounts
through contractual adjustments. 162 The complaint alleges that
assets were overstated by $800 million and that in 2001 income was
overstated by nearly 5,000 percent. 163 The SEC proceedings have
been stayed since May 7, 2003, while the pending criminal
investigation and charges are resolved. Since the SEC complaint and
the criminal indictment are both based on the same set of facts, this
Article focuses on the allegations detailed in the indictment.
The criminal indictment alleges that the fraudulent scheme
perpetrated by HRC and Scrushy overstated income by as much as
$2.7 billion. 164 Count 48 alleges Scrushy willfully made a false
certification on August 14, 2002, while complying with the SEC order,
that the financial statements fairly presented, in all material
16 5
Scrushy's
respects, the financial condition of the company.
attorneys have indicated that they will challenge the August 14
charge by arguing that the certification preceded the necessary SEC
implementing rules that were not adopted until August 27, 2002.166

Their argument is that CEOs were unclear and confused regarding
the scope and implication of their certifications without the greater
detail provided by the rules. After August 2002 some of HRC's
accounting staff members and senior officers, who were required to

157.
158.

Healthsouth Corp., C.A. No. CV-03-J-0615-S (compl.
Scrushy, CR.A. No. CR-03-BE-0530-S (indictment).

159.

Id. at count 50.

160.

HealthSouth Corp., C.A. No. CV-03-J-0615-S (compl.

1).
2); Scrushy, CR.A.

No. CR-03-BE-0530-S (indictment at count 48).
Scrushy, CR.A. No. CR-03-BE-0530-S (indictment at count 49).
161.
HealthSouth Corp., C.A. No. CV-03-J-0615-S (compt. 19).
162.
Id. 24.
163.
Press Release, Department of Justice, HealthSouth Founder and Former
164.

CEO Richard Scrushy Charged in $2.7 Billion Accounting Fraud Conspiracy (Nov. 4,
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opalpr/20O3/November/03_crm_603.htm
2003),
[hereinafter DOJ Press Release].
165.
Scrushy, CR.A. No. CR-03-BE-0530-S (indictment at count 48).
Alex Rue, Senior Trial Counsel, Statement Before U.S. Securities and
166.
Exchange Commission, Atlanta, Ga. (Feb. 2004).
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sign the report, "balked" at making the false accounting entries and
certifying false statements. 16 7 Scrushy then agreed with his coconspirators to develop a plan that would concoct reasons for reduced
revenues, which would allow the coconspirators to stop inflating
168
income.
Count 49 of the criminal indictment alleges that Scrushy
willfully certified that HRC's financial statements were accurate in
all material respects while knowing that the reports "materially
overstated HealthSouth's net income for each of the periods set forth
in the report, and materially overstated the value of HealthSouth's
assets at the end of set periods."'1 69 Count 50 charges that Scrushy
attempted in March 2003 to coerce the CFO to willfully certify that
HRC financial statements fairly presented the financial condition of
the company in all material respects.
There are a total of seventy criminal counts of various forms of
financial fraud, securities laws violations, and money laundering
charges in the grand jury indictment against Scrushy. 7 0 If convicted
of all charges, Scrushy could potentially face a maximum sentence of
650 years in prison, more than $36 million in fines, and forfeiture of
171
$278 million in property.
The government has asserted that the motive for the alleged
crimes emanates from the tremendous financial gain that Scrushy
received from bonuses, stock options, salary, and other benefits that
were tied, directly or indirectly, to the financial performance of
HealthSouth. Between 1996 and 2002 Scrushy received $267 million
in various forms of compensation. 1 72 Although HRC's senior officers
and accounting staff tried to persuade Scrushy to abandon the
financial fraud, he allegedly refused, saying "not until I sell my
stock."'173 The SEC complaint alleges that during the relevant time
period Scrushy sold more than seven million shares of HRC stock
while the share price was based on falsely inflated earnings
reports. 174 In addition, Scrushy received a $6.5 million bonus and
$5.3 million salary also stemming from HRC's false earnings
statements.175
This is a clear example of the perverse incentives created when
executive compensation and stock options are linked to company
earnings. The executives are motivated not only to choose accounting

167.
Scrushy, CR.A. No. CR-03-BE-0530-S (indictment at count 2, 67).
168.
Id.
169.
Id. at count 49.
170.
See generally id.
171.
DOJ Press Release, supra note 164.
172.
Id.
173.
SEC v. HealthSouth Corp., C.A. No. CV-03-J-0615-S (N.D. Ala., Mar. 19,
2003) (compl. 30).
174.
175.

Id.
Id.
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alternatives that best present the company's financial position, but
also to hide losses-just as Andrew Fastow did at Enron through the
creation of off-balance sheet partnerships to absorb the losses, and
just as Scrushy and his co-conspirators allegedly did at HRC through
falsified earnings reports.
The indictment also details the methods that Scrushy allegedly
used to control, harass, and intimidate his co-conspirators, including
such means as electronic and telephonic surveillance. In addition,
Scrushy allegedly offered large compensation packages and other
176
incentives to keep his employees tied to the fraudulent scheme.
Ultimately, at least sixteen individuals at HRC were charged with
17 7
The
crimes as a result of the ongoing HealthSouth investigation.
government has secured fifteen guilty pleas from those individuals,
including former HealthSouth CFOs. 178 All of them are cooperating
with the government in the ongoing investigation and prosecution of
Scrushy. 179 The investigation is coordinated by the Corporate Fraud
Task Force, established by President Bush in July 2002, and is
composed of the FBI and various divisions of the U.S. Attorneys'
Office and the Department of Justice. 8 0 The criminal trial of Richard
Scrushy, the first chief executive of a major U.S. corporation to be
indicted for violations of the Sarbanes-Oxley certification
requirements, began the week of January 3, 2 00 5 .181 As one
commentator noted, "this case will return corporate ethics to centre
stage and test the government's ability to punish CEO wrongdoing
under Sarbanes-Oxley.' 2
B. Following the Learning Curve (or Lack Thereof) of a Corporate
Wrongdoer From the FCPA to the SOA
It is difficult to measure either quantitatively or qualitatively the
possibility of the success of the new legislation and regulations in
deterring further fraudulent or criminal activity. But a rough guess
can be made about the likely success of the SOA by considering the
effect of the very similar accounting fraud provisions of the FCPA.
The Lockheed bribery case of the 1970s, discussed above, was
identified as a chief impetus of the FCPA's passage. Several more
bribery cases through the years involving Lockheed occurred in which

176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

U.S. v. Scrushy, CR.A. No. CR-03-BE-0530-S (indictment at count 1, T 37).
DOJ Press Release, supra note 164.
Id.
Id.
Id.

181.

Andrew Ward, Trial of Ex-Healthsouth Chief to Open, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 3,

2005. Currently, the former financial executives of HealthSouth are testifying for the
prosecution.
Id. (quoting Jacob Frenkel, a specialist in white collar crime at Schulman,
182.
Roges, Gandal, Pordy & Ecker, P.A.).
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acts of bribery were either alleged or sought to be avoided, even up to
2004. These cases give some indication of the learning curve of
Lockheed as a corporate wrongdoer, from the time of the initial
passage of laws and regulations until today, based on Lockheed's own
wrongful acts during the ensuing twenty-five years. An examination
of Lockheed's learning curve may be instructive in assessing the
likely success of the SOA's certification provisions on potential
corporate wrongdoers.
1. 1976: Lockheed Bribery I-One of the Precipitating Factors for the
Passage of the FCPA
Lockheed's massive bribes of foreign officials are well
documented and have been discussed in detail above. The
culmination of its entanglements with the Department of Justice was
a consent decree entered into in 1976.183
2. 1986-1992: Lockheed Bribery II-Lesson Ignored!
In 1984, Lockheed purchased a data processing company,
Datacom Systems Corp.' 8 4 The subsidiary had previously hired
consultants with political and city administration contacts. In 1986,
the consultants were convicted of paying bribes to city officials for
steering lucrative Parking Violators Bureau business to Datacom.
Although the company was never indicted by then-U.S. Attorney
Rudolph Giuliani, the original founder of Datacom testified (under
an immunity deal) that he and two other executives of Datacom had
authorized bribes to get the New York City parking-violation
collection business.' 8 5 The bribes included payments on behalf of
Datacom to the deputy director of the Parking Violations bureau and
were made by one of the consultants who had formerly been a city
transportation administrator. 8 6 The contracts lapsed in 1986.
Datacom changed its name to Lockheed Information Management
System (IMS), and it seemed that Lockheed's latest transgression
8 7
was behind it.
In 1987, the company had a new ethics code and had received a
1 88
good report from the General Services Administration (GSA).

183.
Lockheed Aircraft Corp., [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) P95,509 (D.D.C. 1976).
184.
Frank Sommerfield, Datacom Searches for Ticket to Revival, CRAIN'S N.Y.
Bus., Jan. 9, 1989, at 14, available at Lexis Nexis Academic Universe.
185.
Id.; see Douglas Feiden, Bid Puts Lockheed Back in Parking Lot; Exec to
Help Rid Reputation of Graft, CRAIN'S N.Y. Bus., Feb. 17, 1992, at 17, available at
Lexis Nexis Academic Universe.
186.
Sommerfield, supra note 184.
187.
Feiden, supra note 185.
188.
Sommerfield, supra note 184.
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Armed with these-and having several major cities as clients in the
parking-ticket collection business-Lockheed IMS in 1992 again
sought to handle the parking-ticket collection business in New York
City.' 8 9 It started with a low-ball bid for a smaller contract to key
punch five million tickets for the Parking Violations Bureau. Then
the company hired a high-profile public relations firm, a lobbying
firm, and a high-powered law firm. 190 Lockheed IMS's bid was
accepted, but only briefly, because there was a hue and cry of "foul
play" in the way in which New York City's budget director had
selected the successful bidder. The budget director lost his job, and
Lockheed IMS's "successful" bid was permanently suspended. 19 1
Obviously, Lockheed had not yet learned its lesson about the
unethical and illegal repercussions of bribery.
3. 1995: Lockheed Bribery III-Lesson Yet Unlearned!
In 1995, Lockheed paid one of the largest fines ever levied under
the FCPA: $21.8 million, plus a $3 million civil settlement with the
U.S. government for bribing a foreign official in violation of the
FCPA, the very law which was enacted partially because of
Lockheed's own illegal bribes in the early 1970s. 19 2 Lockheed, its
sales director for the Middle East and North Africa, and a regional
Vice President of the company were indicted for allegedly paying
more than $1 million to an Egyptian legislator, Lelia Takia, to win a
$79 million contract for the sale of three C-130 planes. 19 3 Lockheed's
profit on the deal was $12.4 million. The maximum penalty allowed
under the law is a fine of up to double the profits earned from the
194
illegal venture.
The usual excuses were made: (1) Lockheed officials did not
know that Takia was an Egyptian official, (2) Lockheed's internal
investigations found that regrettable mistakes in judgment were
made by a few employees in the marketing organization, (3) Lockheed
claimed that no employees outside the marketing organization had

189.

Id.

190.

Id.

191.
John J. Doran, City Budget Director Resigns Over Handling of Parking
Bureau Contract, BOND BUYER, Aug. 23, 1993, at 2; see Alair Townsend, Even in the
Best Cause, Rigging of Bids Isn't Right, CRAIN'S N. Y. Bus., Aug. 30, 1993, at 17,
available at Lexis Nexis Academic Universe.
192.
U.S. v. Lockheed Corp., 3 FCPA Rep. 699.176 (N.D. Ga. 1995); see Andrea
D. Bontrager Unzicker, From Corruption to Cooperation: Globalization Brings a
Multilateral Agreement Against Foreign Bribery, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 655,

663-64 (2000); see also $24.8 Million Penalty Paid by Lockheed, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28,
1995, at 35.
193.
$24.8 Million Penalty Paid by Lockheed, supra note 192.
194.
Lockheed Pleads Guilty to Bribery Conspiracy; Firm Agrees to Pay $24.8
Million in Fines, WASH. POST, Jan. 28, 1995, at C1.
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knowledge of these events, and (4) no current employees of the
marketing organization were responsible in these matters (i.e., the
195
scapegoats had been fired).
Lockheed committed the very same act of bribery of a foreign
official to give it an advantage in obtaining a contract. Twenty years
had passed since Lockheed had first been exposed in Watergate to the
wrath of the public, the government, and the regulatory agencies. Yet
the company had still not developed an ethical internal culture or a
commitment to follow the FCPA, a law with which it certainly should
have been intimately familiar.
4. 2004: Lockheed 1V-A Change of Culture?
A merger proposal is currently pending between Lockheed
Martin and Titan Corp., and the companies are in the course of
examining the feasibility and profitability of the merger. 196 The two
companies jointly "initiated meetings with the SEC to advise of an
internal review relating to certain agreements between Titan and
international consultants and related payments in foreign
countries. ''197 Lockheed Martin has requested that Titan give it
access to all information related to its relationships with
international consultants. 198
A statement from a Lockheed spokesperson, Tom Jurkowsky,
could not have been clearer in its assertion that:
During the course of that [routine review of policies and procedures of a
company that Lockheed is acquiring] we noticed that Titan had
contracts in countries that historically have been associated with
international consultant payments and we know that there have been
problems in some of these countries. When we saw that, we told Titan,
that we said we need to do a review here. The time to do it is now, not
after we close the deal. 1 9 9

Is it a combination of the penalties of both the FCPA and the
SOA that has now changed the attitude of Lockheed? Has it been
caught too many times? Is it wary about tarnishing its reputation
further by risking the imposition of large penalties? Can Lockheed
afford to "showcase" its virtues because less than two percent of
Titan's business involved international sales of products 20 0 and such
a clear stance of jointly reporting the possibility of illegal foreign

195.
Id.
196.
Titan Announces SEC Investigation, PR NEWSWIRE, Feb. 13, 2004,
available at Lexis Nexis Academic Universe.
197.
Id.
198.
Id.
199.
Jerry Hirsch, Foreign Payments by Titan Come Under Scrutiny, L.A. TIMES,
Feb. 14, 2004, at C2.
200.
Id.
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payments to the SEC will enhance its ethical reputation but not
endanger the merger? The answer is probably found in a combination
of these, but nevertheless the result is that in 2004, Lockheed has
finally decided to present a more ethical profile to the public, its
stakeholders, the government, and the regulators.
C. Additional Factors That Can Be Used to Make Assumptions About
the Possibility of Success

1. The United States' Ranking in Transparency International's 2004
Corruption Perception Index and Its 2002 Bribes Perception Index (as
an Indicator of the Effect of Legislation, Regulation, and Judicial
Decisions in the United States after 1977)
Transparency International (TI), a leading non-governmental
organization started in Berlin in 1993, developed two indexes that are
of particular note because they give some indication of whether the
FCPA deters accounting fraud and other kinds of accounting
misconduct necessary to conceal large scale bribery of foreign
officials. These are (1) the Corruption Perception Index, which is
based on the perceived level of bribe-taking, and (2) the Bribe Payers
Perceptions Index, which measures the perceived sources of bribepayments in the leading exporting nations. Although the advantage
of having a year-by-year study of the indexes since the passage of the
FCPA is lacking, some information about the global perceptions of the
United States twenty to twenty-five years after its passage can be
gleaned from these two indexes.
a. Corruption Perception Index
Since 1995, Transparency International has annually ranked
countries based on the perceived level of bribe-taking-the
Corruption Perception Index (CPI).2o 1 TI scores countries
individually, rather than ranking them relative to other countries.
The maximum score is ten points; the greater the score, the greater
the perception that a country has succeeded in reducing corruption.
In 1995, the United States, the only country with a specific law
against foreign bribery payments (the FCPA, which was passed
eighteen years earlier), had a score of 7.79. The United States ranked
seventeenth overall. 20 2 New Zealand had the top CPI score of 9.55.

201.
See Press Release, Transparency Int'l Corruption Index, New Zealand Best,
Indonesia Worst in World Poll of International Corruption (July 15, 1995), available at
http://www.transparency.orglcpi]1995/cpi1995.pdf.
202.
Id.
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The last reported CPI was in 2004. The U.S. score was 7.5; the
highest score was Finland's, 9.7. The United States again ranked
2 03
seventeenth.
b. Bribe Payers Perception Index
In 1999, TI developed the Bribe Payers Perception Index (BPI) to
measure the supply side of bribery-in other words, the BPI
measures the perceptions of which countries' corporations are offering
bribes. Executives at major corporations, chambers of commerce,
commercial banks, and law firms in fourteen emerging-market
nations answered detailed questionnaires about their perceptions of
which countries are homes to multinational corporations paying
bribes. Like the CPI, the BPI scores on a zero-to-ten scale, with ten
representing a corrupt-free exporting country.
In the last reported BPI of 2002, 835 business experts in fifteen
leading countries were interviewed. 20 4 The question asked was "[i]n
the business sectors with which you are most familiar, please indicate
how likely companies from the following countries are to pay or offer
bribes to win or retain business in this country (i.e., respondent's
country of residence)?" 20 5 The highest score of 8.5 was received by
Australia. The United States received a score of 5.3, placing it
thirteenth in the overall rankings. 20 6 Thus, although U.S. companies
have risked criminal penalties since 1977 under the FCPA, the U.S.
firms were perceived as continuing to use bribes abroad to win
business.
c. A Review of the CPI and BPI Results After the Passage of Criminal
Penalties for Bribery in the Organization of Economic Cooperation
and Development's 1999 Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign
Officials in International Business Transactions
It was hoped that the agreement of all the leading exporting
countries to the 1999 Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign
Officials in International Business Transactions (hereinafter, the
Convention) of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) would have a constructive effect on global
corruption.2 0 7 The Convention makes bribery of foreign officials a

203.
Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 2004 (Oct. 20, 2004),
availableat httpJ/www.transparency.orgpressreleases._archive20042004.10.20.cpi.en.html.
204.
Transparency International Bribe Payers Index 2002 (May 14, 2002),
availableat httpJ/www.transparency.org/pressreleasesarchive/2002/2002.05.14.bpi.en.html.
205.
Id.
206.
Id.
207.
See Barbara C. George & Kathleen A. Lacey, A Coalition of Industrialized
Nations, Developing Nations, MultilateralDevelopment Banks, and Non-Governmental
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criminal offense and imposes a duty on all signing countries to
implement the passage of anti-bribery legislation. Before the adoption
of the Convention, the United States was the only country that
imposed criminal penalties upon those engaged in bribery. The
criminal penalties included in the 1999 OECD Anti-Bribery
Convention should have created a further deterrent against corrupt
behavior. It appears, however, that international bribery continues to
occur with some regularity despite the legislative penalties,
regulatory action, public outrage, and media attention.
U.S. companies no longer have the excuse that they are forced to
bribe foreign officials illegally to remain competitive because other
countries can make legal bribes for contracts. But if one looks at the
BPI and CPI scores of the United States, there is no dramatic
improvement of the record of U.S. companies for perceived corruption
and bribery, regardless of the pressures of the OECD Convention and
the FCPA.
2. The Recent Reduction in the Number of Corporate Fraud Cases
Some deterrent effect on corporate misconduct seems to exist
now as a result of the recent "spectacle of executives being handcuffed
and hauled off to jail. ' 20 8 At least superficial evidence of this is
indicated by the fact that since the Enron scandal came to the
forefront in 2002, enforcement actions by the SEC have declined 14.7
percent in the current fiscal year. 20 9 It has been sobering for
prospective perpetrators of corporate misconduct to see punishment
imposed on many former high-level executives. The reforms of the
SOA, such as its certification requirements, have forced executives to
"think twice about questionable financial schemes. ' 210 But the effect
of seeing the perp-walks on national television will probably be shortlived. With the passage of time, memories will fade, and there may be
a return to the same patterns of misconduct. But it is to be hoped that
the current trial of Richard Scrushy of HealthSouth will effectively
enforce the SOA's certification requirements and thereby be an
effective deterrent to fraudulent financial reporting.

Organizations; A Pivotal Complement to Current Anti-Corruption Initiatives, 33
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 547, 570 (2000).
208.
Jonathan Peterson, Corporate Fraud Cases Decline, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 2,
2004, at C1.
209.
Id.
210.

Id.
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V. CONCLUSION

Multiple factors affect the likelihood of achieving the goal of
deterring corrupt and unethical corporate behavior. The SOA has
already improved corporate accountability, as is demonstrated both
by the steps many corporations have taken to comply with its new
211
provisions and by the recent reduction in SEC enforcement actions.
In a hearing of the House Financial Services Committee in July 2004,
marking the second anniversary of the SOA's passage, Representative
Oxley summarized the Act's effect as follows:
Responsibility to shareholders is the heart and soul of Sarbanes-Oxley.
The goal was to restore investor confidence by enhancing the reliability
of financial statements, and .1 believe that goal has largely been
achieved. On balance, Sarbanes-Oxley has been a positive thing for
212
both publicly traded companies and for the country.

Regarding company listings, Oxley said, "[c]ompanies' need to
access U.S. markets will continue to outweigh resistance to SarbanesOxley. Many executives also understand that Sarbanes-Oxley has
made a tremendous contribution to their bottom lines through the
restoration of investors' willingness to buy."2 13 Finally, regarding
compliance costs, Oxley said, "[mloney is the language of business,
and if Sarbanes-Oxley doesn't cost anything, it probably also wouldn't
mean anything. We have achieved a change in corporate culture and
2 14
a new definition of what it means to be a publicly traded company."
On an ongoing basis, the House Financial Services Committee has
committed both to monitoring and reviewing SOA's implementation,
including agency regulatory actions, the work of the Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board created by the Act, and the statute's
international implications.215
At the same time, behind the scenes, pressure is growing for

Solomon & Bryan-Low, supra note 64.
211.
House Committee on Financial Services Committee News: Committee to
212.
Discuss Restoration of Investor Confidence in Era of Sarbanes-Oxley (July 21, 2004),
available at http://financialservices.house.gov/news.asp. As support for this conclusion,
it was noted that at the end of 2003, U.S. markets were capitalized at $15.5 trillion,
and much of the $8 trillion lost during the aftermath of the high-tech bubble and the
period of corporate malfeasance had been restored. The Standard & Poor's 500-stock
index rose twenty-six percent during 2003. As of mid-2003, approximately 16,000
companies were reporting information to the SEC, and new offerings had picked up,
with greater numbers of equity offerings in the pipeline. Finally, companies did not delist in significant numbers, as had been predicted, and foreign countries and companies
were beginning to comply with the law's requirements for access to U.S. markets. Id.
213.
Id.
214.
Id.
COMM. ON FIN. SERV., 108TH CONG., OVERSIGHT PLAN (Comm. Print, 2003).
215.
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scaling back some of SOA's provisions. At the same July 2004
committee hearing, "lawmakers and corporate officials raised the
prospect of reopening debate .

.

. on the part of the law that requires

companies to assess how well their internal financial controls work, a
provision that a study by Financial Executives International said cost
216
some large companies more than $5 million each this year.
Shortly before the hearing, John Thain, CEO of the New York Stock
Exchange, published a commentary in the Wall Street Journal
blaming "disclosure and accounting requirements in Sarbanes-Oxley
for a reduction in the number of foreign companies that trade on the
exchange."2 17 David Smith, president of the American Society of

216.
Carrie Johnson & Jeffrey Birnbaum, Corporate Reforms Reassessed, WASH.
POST, July 23, 2004, at E 1. "Considered the backbone of a company's finance system...
[controls] include such things as whether multiple officials are required to sign off on
company checks and whether employee expense reports are scrutinized by managers."
Carrie Johnson, Audit Compliance Deadline Proves Costly to Companies, WASH. POST,
Nov. 15, 2004, at A14. The SOA internal financial control review rules required major
companies with fiscal years ending Nov. 15, 2004, to have completed their reviews by
that date. Id. Other large firms' deadlines would come up thereafter "as their fiscal
years came to an end, rolling through the next 12 months." Id. The rules required
smaller and foreign companies to finish documenting their controls by July 15, 2005.
Id. As it became apparent that many companies were at serious risk of not finishing
their work on time, the SEC said that while it "would not grant a broad-based reprieve
from the deadline for large companies . . . the agency would monitor the situation
closely ... [and] might give smaller firms, with fewer resources, a short break from the
deadline." Id. On November 30, 2005, the SEC "granted companies with market value
between $75 million and $700 million an additional 45 days to file reports on their
internal controls." Carrie Johnson, SEC Delays Reviews for Some Firms, WASH. POST,
Dec. 1, 2004, at El. Some corporate executives responded that a forty-five day
extension was not enough. Id. A trade association for technology firms pledged over the
next several months to "reach out to lawmakers and SEC officials to try to persuade
them to study the costs and impact of the internal control rules." Id.
Johnson & Birnbaum, CorporateReforms Reassessed, supra note 216. Non217.
U.S. companies are increasingly objecting to the obligations of Sarbanes-Oxley,
particularly the CEO and CFO certification provisions regarding financial disclosure
and attestation of internal controls. Jennifer Schneck & Jennifer Thelen, Non U.S.
Companies Face Trouble Quitting the U.S., LEGAL WK. GLOBAL, July 29, 2004. Their
concerns are significant enough that a number of foreign companies are seriously
considering de-listing their securities on the U.S. exchanges. Id. For example:
The Germans are disenchanted by the United States as a source of capital, and
offended by what they view as oppressive new regulations adopted in the
aftermath of Enron and other corporate scandals. With trading volumes in New
York that are, in most cases, a small fraction of their turnover in Europe, the
companies are less willing to bear the legal costs, liability and the bureaucracy
of complying with the rules. . . . Until now, the public discontent has been
limited to little-known companies like Lion Bioscience and SGL Carbon. But
last week, German newspapers reported that Siemens was mulling whether to
delist its shares from the New York Stock Exchange, where it has traded since
2001.
Mark Landler, Germans Weigh Taking Stocks Off Wall Street, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20,
2004, at Cl. Shortly after granting domestic companies with market value between $75
million and $700 million an extra forty-five days to report on their internal controls,
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Corporate Secretaries, said his group "also had been talking with the
accounting oversight board to try to ease internal control
requirements, which he said have caused problems for small and midsize companies." 218 Some of the SOA's requirements have not yet
come into effect, 2 19 and commentators have suggested that "[m]any of
the reforms adopted by Congress and the SEC will not remedy the
220
situation."
In view of SOA's mixed reviews, and in order to look beyond the
short-term effect of the statute and to consider its long-term promise,
SOA must be examined in a broader historical context. Based on this
history, it would appear that the SOA alone cannot fully prevent the
financial chicanery that tempts corporate executives who stand to
reap tremendous financial benefits from ever more creative schemes.
For example, in spite of the existence of the August 2002 SEC
certification order and the adoption of the SOA, HealthSouth CEO
Richard Scrushy continued to falsify earnings because of the
tremendous financial rewards he received from compensation and
stock options tied to those false earnings. Before that, Lockheed had
followed the same pattern. Although the FCPA was enacted mainly
as a result of Lockheed's wrongful acts in the early 1970s, penalties of
$24.8 million were levied against it in 1995 for bribing a foreign
government official to obtain a contract that would result in a profit
of $12.4 million-an act of bribery similar to those committed by the

see supra note 216, the SEC signaled that it might also grant foreign companies whose
stock trades on U.S. exchanges a brief delay to comply. Carrie Johnson, SEC May
Delay Reviews, WASH. POST, Dec. 7, 2004, at El. Speaking to an AICPA national
conference, SEC Chief Accountant Donald Nicolaisen said:
We have [sic] and continue to be sensitive to the need to accommodate unique
foreign structures and requirements. Clearly many non-U.S. issuers and their
auditors are working hard and are well on their way to completing the work
necessary to report on internal controls. However, I am sensitive that this
requires, in some cases, great cultural change.
Id.
218.
Johnson & Birnbaum, supra note 216. Small companies, in particular,
complain that they are "overburdened by the control rules and that regulators and
lawmakers should consider cutting back on the list of things that small companies
must examine." Johnson, SEC Delays Reviews for Some Firms,supra note 216.
219.
David Henry, Fuzzy Numbers, BUS. WK., Oct. 4, 2004, available at
http://www.businessweek.com/print/magazine/content/04_40/b3902001-mzOO1 .htm.
220.
Id. In addition, these commentators have remarked:
No doubt, chief executives and auditing committees are paying closer attention
to the numbers, and accounting experts believe there are fewer instances these
days of outright fraud. But that's to be expected in a stronger economy. The big
question is whether increased scrutiny is yielding more realistic estimates or
just more estimates documented by reams of assumptions and rationalizations.
We'll only know the answer when the economy begins to falter and corporate
earnings come under pressure.
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company more than two decades before.
It is argued that the legislation and regulation cannot tame the
2 21
market forces that tempt a corporate executive to commit fraud.
This is demonstrated by the U.S.'s mediocre performance, after
passage of the FCPA, on the Transparency International indexes and,
in particular, by the willingness of Richard Scrushy and the
wrongdoers of the Enron era to commit illegal and unethical acts. The
effect of the SOA cannot be measured at this time because the
business world is still caught in the immediate aftermath of the latest
scandals. The long-range success of the newest legislation governing
corporate disclosure and reporting will be known only when public
outrage abates over scandals and the images of perpetrators in
handcuffs fade.
The current globalization of world economies gives added
strength to the SOA in comparison to the era during which the FCPA
was passed. 222 The SOA has the advantage of the history of the
FCPA, during the timeframe from 1977 to 1999, when the U.S. stood
alone in adopting an anti-bribery law.2 2 3 This history is now
combined with the stringent rules of SOA in the new era of
globalization that has brought with it important business antias
corruption actions taken by international organizations such 22
7
224
the OECD, 225 OAS, 226 the U.N.,
Transparency International,
228
The overall effect will be increased
and the Council of Europe.
pressure on businesses toward ethical and legal conduct. Although
resistance to further regulation is growing on both sides of the

SEC Chairman William Donaldson, in a speech last fall to the Conference
221.
Board in New York, described the erosion of trust in business resulting from recent
scandals as "a serious and worrying development, and there's no guarantee the
problem will automatically get resolved." SEC Chief Tells Business to Clean Up Act,
L.A. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2004, at C4. While the SEC and other regulators can put clear
rules in place, he added, "We know from the course of history that human nature will
push aggressive managers and organizations to continue to test new laws." Id.
See Philip M. Nichols, Regulating Transnational Bribery in Times of
222.
Globalizationand Fragmentation,24 YALE J. INT'L L. 257 (1999).

Steven R. Salbu, Bribery in the Global Market: A Critical Analysis of the
223.
Foreign CorruptPracticesAct, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 229, 232 (1997).
224.
As has been noted earlier in the Article, Transparency International
periodically issues the Bribe Payers Index and the Corruption Perception Index. See
supra text accompanying note 204.
OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
225.
International Business Transactions, Dec. 18, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 1.
226.
OAS Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, Mar. 29, 1996, 35
I.L.M. 724.
United Nations Declaration Against Corruption and Bribery in
227.
International Commercial Transactions, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., U.N. Doc.
A/RES/51/191 (Dec. 16, 1996).

228.
173.

Criminal Law Convention on Corruption., Jan. 27, 1999, Europ. T.S. No.
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Atlantic, 229 "the political reality is that no politician can risk
230
appearing to be opposed to financial reform.
Despite the twenty-five year history of the accounting provisions
of the FCPA, which was preceded by a half century's experience with
federal securities laws, U.S. corporate culture has continued to spawn
financial fraud and misconduct that periodically escalates and results
in catastrophic losses to stakeholders. From the passage of the
original FCPA in 1977 to the passage of the SOA in 2002, corporate
fraud and corruption have been prevalent. The experience emanating
from the FCPA is a predictive indicator of the SOA's potential failure
to deter misconduct. But the FCPA's greatest role in providing indicia
for the success or failure of the SOA is that it is part of a cumulative
effort to deter through legislation corrupt and unethical corporate
behavior-a cumulative effort imposing penalties that substantially
increase the chances for successful deterrence of corporate
misconduct, despite the constitutional due process concerns raised in
regard to the penalties. The long-term effect of increasing corporate
regulation during the past three decades and the worldwide interest
in preventing business corruption should reduce the number of
23 1
executives willing to risk the penalties and the public censure.

229.
For example, in Brussels on December 16, 2004, "the European Federation
of Accountants declared its opposition to what it views as 'excessive regulation' of
Floyd Norris, 3 Years After Enron,
auditors under proposed European rules."
Resistance to New Rules Grows, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2004, at Cl.
Id.
230.
231.
The cumulative effect of investor-protective legislation and regulation is
suggested by observations of long-time commentators on the topic. Referring to the
recent surge in prosecutions of high-level executives, Carrie Johnson and Ben White
recently observed:
Compared with previous cycles of boom and bust, more high-profile chief
executives have been indicted and convicted of more serious charges than ever
before. Prosecutors are going after executives at the highest levels, seeking
redress for the millions of middle-income families, many of whom were new to
the stock market, whose mutual funds and retirement savings accounts were
hurt when prices collapsed amid charges of wrongdoing and puffery.
Carrie Johnson & Ben White, No Safety at the Top For CorporateLeaders, WASH. POST,
July 9, 2004, at Al. Noting that recent scandals and abuses represent "the greatest
period of malfeasance since the 1930s," Charles Geisst, a business historian at
Manhattan College, suggests that 'the only reason we didn't have indictments in the
'30s was we didn't have the laws yet."' Id. While the pattern of ebb and flow in investor
protection efforts is familiar ("First comes a period of permissive regulatory oversight
.... Then the economy shifts and business undergoes a heightened level of government
security, leading to prosecutions and a 'cry to get scalps.' Finally, Congress passes
Id.), the difference
tough-on-corporate-crime laws that expand criminal penalties ....
this time, according to Washington defense lawyer William H. Jeffress Jr., is that now
'the numbers are a lot bigger, the people better known, and the penalties a lot higher."'
Id.
Another indicator of the cumulative effect may be derived from the explosion of
civil penalties imposed by the SEC over the past few years. "Since 1986, the SEC has
reached a dozen financial settlements that called for companies to pay $50 million or
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more, and nine of the twelve have come in the past year, according to a recent speech
by SEC enforcement chief Stephen M. Cutler." Id. This may reflect recent increases in
the SEC's enforcement resources: "The agency has hired more than 1000 accountants,
lawyers and economists since late 2002-a 27% increase in its professional staff.... In
fiscal 2002 alone, the agency filed almost 50 percent more financial fraud and reporting
cases than in the previous year." Carrie Johnson, Motivated to Prosecute, WASH. POST,
Oct. 20, 2004, at El. Moreover, federal prosecutors involved in the government-wide
task force initiated by President Bush to root out business crime had convicted more
than 500 corporate wrongdoers, as of September 2004, out of 900 suspects criminally
charged, with many of the trials still pending. Id.
One measure of the pressures of the SOA, probably unanticipated by its drafters,
has been an increase in the number of corporate chief financial officers calling it quits.
"Over the last three years, more than 225 CFO's of the Fortune 500 companies have
left," and executive search firms have suggested the pace has been similar at smaller or
privately held companies. Claudia H. Deutsch, Where Have all the Chief Financial
Officers Gone?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2004, at C5.Deutsch recently noted:
CFO magazine recently asked 227 finance executives how their work lives had
changed in the last two years. The results portray a severely disgruntled group:
68 percent said the pressures on them had increased; 53 percent said they were
working more; 61 percent groused that they had more work than their
colleagues; 63 percent thought that work-related stress had had a deleterious
effect on their health. About 40 percent blamed regulatory rules and staff cuts
for their newly dismal work lives. But more than half said they were more
upset by their superiors' reactions to new rules than by the rules themselves.
They said chief executives were demanding ever more information for planning
and budgeting and were asking them to review their strategic decisions at everearlier stages.

